1. The objective of this document.
The US and the European union are pushing Israel to sign a peace treaty with Syria. The governments of Israel sought to negotiate with Syria’s president Assad and the current government went to the extreme and declared that it agrees to withdraw even from the 1923 international border in order to appease Assad and lure him to the negotiation table.
These moves endanger the future of Israel. Relinquishing and destruction of the Golan which is now practically for 33 years and officially for 19 years and Israeli territory, is a revolting process which will push Israel into an existential danger. This is a risk that must be avoided. The aim of this paper is to define the problem, to give some facts about the history of the Golan, to analyze the present situation and point to a comprehensive settlement which will can rescue Israel in the last minute, from the letal trap into which its government is jumping.
It should be pointed out in advance that the main problem is not a military one and also not a problem of the settlers of the Golan. It is a problem of the future existence of the whole state of Israel including every citizen in the center, in the north and in the South.

2. The existential question
For the last 26 years since June 1967, Israel has considered the Golan Heights as an integral part of the state and in 1981 the Knesset officially included it as a sovereign part of the state. 33 new villages were built in the deserted areas. In October 1973 Syria surprised Israel and hundreds of Syrian tanks poured into the Golan and thanks to the topographic advantages of the terrain and the spirit of the lower ranks of the IDF, the invasion failed and Israel regained control of the Golan and part of southern Syria within less than a week of intense heroic fighting. During the past 26 years the Golan is the most peaceful region in Israel due to the inherent security advantages of this essential area.
The current government of Israel is aggressively promoting a deal in which Israel is expected to abandon the whole of the Golan, destroy 33 flourishing villages and a town, and lose the critical defense capabilities. All that in exchange for limited normalization and technological substitutes expected to replace the essential defense posts in the Golan.
What is the source of this sharp change of policy? What is the process that brought about this collapse of position? Can Israel be safe in the Islamic Middle East after loss of the Golan? If not why is the current government embracing this existential risk?

3. History
The Golan is a semi-mountainous escarpment of some 400 square miles (about 10 miles wide and 40 miles long), ranging in height from 400 to 3,000 feet. It rises steeply from the eastern and northern shores of the Sea of Galilee, runs the length of the Huleh Valley, and overlooks the coastal plains of the Galilee and northern Israel.
-During the whole history of the Holy Land the Golan was integral part of the Land of Israel (which was renamed as “Palestine” by the Romans ~2000 years ago in a symbol for the elimination of the Jewish independence). The archeology is a rich evidence of Jewish presence in the Golan throughout history.

-This continued under the Otheman Empire.

At the end of World War I, during the division of the defeated Ottoman Empire, the Golan Heights were included in the territory of British Mandate Palestine. In 1923 they were transferred to French Mandate Syria under a Franco-British agreement delineating the boundary between Mandate Syria and Mandate Palestine. After Israel declared independence in 1948 and defeated the Syrian and other Arab forces that invaded to destroy the new state, that boundary became the basis for the Syrian-Israeli armistice line negotiated in 1949.

 For the next eighteen years, until the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Syria used its position on the Heights to shell Israeli farms and settlements in the Galilee below and to attack Israeli water projects in the Huleh Valley. Syrians on the Golan attempted to divert the headwaters of the Jordan River, which would have severely curtailed Israel's water supply. Israel used military force to oppose the diversion.

-1967 Syria joined Egypt and Jordan in the war against Israel and in the last two days of the Six days war, Israel conquered the Golan, and regained control of the area. That was the end of 21 years of Syrian control of the Golan. The natural continuation of this rescue war was implementation of the Israeli law (1981) and building villages and towns.

Since 1967 and the subsequent attempt in 1973 to retake the Heights, Syria has used various means, including terrorism and diplomacy, to press Israel to relinquish the Golan. Successive Israeli governments, under both Labor and Likud, have characterized the Golan Heights as essential to Israeli security.

-October 1973: Syria and Egypt attacked Israel on Yom Kippur, the Jewish holy day. The government and the high command of the IDF ignored multiple early warning signals and multiple “red warning lights” and failed to prepare for the attack. Israel was caught under total surprise. The worst possible defense scenario. Jordan, Morocco and Saudi Arabia sent mission forces to the Golan.

-Despite the failure of the leadership at the top levels, two factors jointly helped to rescue Israel:

3.1. The heroic determination and sacrifice by the lower ranks of the Army. The young people were ready to “go into the fire”, literally, and drove the invaders out of the Golan.

3.2. The terrain of the Golan – the line of hills in the East, and the strategic depth of the Golan that supported the defense despite the fact that only small force were deployed in time.

This combination enabled Israel to block the invasion and regain full control of the Golan in a 48 hours re-battle.

Despite the massive Syrian attacks only two military strongholds on the front lines were captured by Syria, while others survived. (The strength of the front line strong-holds which were then bypassed by the Syrian forces, was a major factor in the fast victory of the IDF. The Syrians were pushed out of the Golan in a 48 hours long re-battle (days 3 and 4 of that war)). Two days latter (on the Sixth day) the IDF conquered large bulge inside Syria east of the Golan and the road to Damascus was open.

 –An Iraqi army armored division arrived and joined the battle on the seventh day. After six months, in April 1974 Israel withdrew to the current lines, Syria regained control of major areas south of Damascus in a “separation of forces” deal signed under the supervision and negotiations of Dr. Henry Kissinger, the US secretary of states.

-Since 1974 the Golan front was much more peaceful than the current Egyptian-Israeli border which was established by the Camp David accord. Even during the Lebanon war in 1982 the Syrian forces in the Golan did not change formation and did not move.

In December, 1981, Israel enacted legislation extending its civil law and administration to the Golan, replacing the military authority which had ruled there for 14 years.

Current population in the Golan: 5 Druse villages and 33 Jewish villages and one town. No Arab villages under Israel control except for one Allawi village (Rajar).

4. Analysis of the present situation.

4.1. Can Israel rely on foreign aid in case of war?

1948 – The newborn state of Israel was invaded by seven armies and it was not at all clear that it would survive. Two weeks after the invasion the Egyptian army was 18 miles from Tel Aviv. The UK actively support the Arab army of Jordan that invaded Israel, the US embargoed shipment of military equipment to Israel.

1956 – The US and the other superpower threatened to attack Israel if it would not give the Sinai back to Egypt after the October 1956 campaign. They jointly guaranteed the freedom of navigation the Suez canal and the straits leading to the gulf of Eilat and the safety of Israel.

1967 – when the Arab armies gathered around Israel the US and the other super-powers told Israel that it is “on its own” (the state department people “could not find” the paper of the 1956 declaration of guarantees).

1973 – following the attack by several Arab armies, the US delayed aid for at least a week. Israel was on its own, alone.  (Kissinger was quoted as saying: “let them bleed”).

No chance that any foreign army will be able to assist Israel under conditions of attack by the Arabs, the time scale is simply too fast. It will take too much time to move forces to the Middle East, and wars here are short and intense. It took 6 months to build the forces for the “desert storm” operation. Kuwait could be recovered; there will be no Israel to be recovered in case of Arab attack that will not be met with capability for self-defense. Can Israel rely on any promise of support of any foreign force? NO. It is too small and has no strategic depth to hold until help arrives. The battle may be over before anyone arrives at the scene. No need for any help after a week, there simply will be no Israel.

4.2.  Can modern surveillance and early warning electronic systems serve as equivalent substitute to the land defense on the Eastern front of Israel?

The experience of the October 1973 war shows that the answer is negative. The information was available, the Mount Hermon electronics systems monitored most of the movements of the Syrian army and yet the leadership refused to use the facts and preferred to ignore it. No one can guarantee that such failure is of low probability. It was too many times repeated in human history. No modern or super sophisticated technology can overcome blindness of a leadership when it does not want to get involved in fighting. 

4.3. the present Israeli “state of mind”

Why do so many Israelis follow the policy of “land for peace” to the extreme dictated by the Arab ultimatum of “every inch in exchange for ‘cold peace’ ”? Why do so many Israelis accept the asymmetry between the totality of the Arab position and the compromising Israeli position? Why do they accept the fate that their future and very existence would again be dependent of the good will of other nations? Why do they overturn the basic aspirations of the first generation Zionists who were willing to sacrifice everything in order (a) to established a viable fully independent homeland, (b) to be self sufficient in ability to defend it, and (c) to secure the sovereignty over every settlements and citizens in the renewed homeland?

4.4. The current deterioration:

Israel won three major defensive wars against coalitions of belligerent Arab states that still hope, to get rid of the Zionist enterprise. Instead of conducting like the winner, which according to the common rules of international practice may change borders, enforce conditions and get the support of the free world, here the aggressors are gaining more and more support, even from the Israeli left. It boils down now to a situation whereby it appears as if there is symmetry between parties, no loser no winner, both have to compromise. The aggressors do not have to pay the toll of the outcome of their aggression. This can act as a major cause for loss of deterrence against any renewal of hostile actions against Israel. The current “peace” process that erases the losses suffered by the aggressors in past wars (1967 and 1973) is the strongest possible encouragement for repeating attempts to destroy Israel. The lesson to any potential aggressor here would be very simple: try again, at worst you will slowly drift back to square one, whereby you will be poised for another attempt. The cycle can go on and on.

Moreover, there is a drift, in the negative direction for Israel which is symbolized by the so called principle of “land for peace” which is a fake principle, because only one side (ironically the winner which was attacked), Israel, is requested to yield to the demands of the aggressors and grant them land (real asset) in change for a political agreement, which is a wishful thinking. This is a dangerous asymmetry. The principle of  “land for peace” can be applied only if it is implemented symmetrically, i.e. a real compromise in which disputed territories are divided by a compromise and not delivered “an block” to one side.

The pathological process, called “peace negotiation” started to materialize after the Yom Kippur war. With the interim agreement with Egypt and Syria, mediated by Dr. Henry Kissinger, when they where granted major parts of land without any move towards a permanent peace settlement. The culmination of this phase was the Camp David treaty in which Israel yielded to Egypt the whole of the Sinai, “up to the last inch”. There the fake principle was established that the state of the Jews is not entitled to a single inch of any Arab holy land, no matter how many times it is attacked. and no compromise can be expected. The ultimatum by Sa’adat was accepted.

 That was the beginning of the collapse of the resistance power of Israel to political blackmailing that was the alternative warfare for the Arabs who lost in the battle filed, to bring Israel to her knees.

The second stage of this collapse process of Israel’s policy was the Oslo accord, which was held for a while by the public response in the 1996 elections, yet the government did not take steps to stop that dangerous process.

The third phase is coming now:  the danger of loosing the Golan Heights, already a sovereign part of Israel. In The following phases other sections of the Land (West of the Jordan river) would be demanded by one of Israel’s neibors.

The Arabs still reject the very existence of a Jewish state in the middle of the Moslem Arab domain in the Middle East and this is an unsolvable source of the conflict.

5. conclusions.

5.1. The conflict in the Middle East is not simply a conflict over land. It is a collision between two cultures that are incompatible. Worse of all, it is a conflict between religions. The Islam is inherently intolerant to the Jewish faith (and to the Christian faith, remember the fate of the Maronite communities in Lebanon). There is no fundamental Islam, this is the Islam.

The problem: “in the Moslem domain of the middle east there is no place for a Jewish independent state as well as other non-Moslem minorities”.

This is a conflict that has no quick solution; we have to be able to live with the conflict for a long time. It is possible if the forces that push for elimination of the Jewish state are counterbalanced by the determination and ability for self-defense by Israel. Therefore the illusion that an agreement can solve the conflict is very dangerous.

5.2. Asymmetry: Israel wants peace with the Arabs; the Arabs want “peace” without Israel. The stepwise strategy of Israel neighbors is very straightforward “to take back every inch of land lost in the 1967 (and eventually land they lost in 1948) and return to square one, i.e. the June 4^th 1967 lines”. The Arab negotiators adhere to basic principles, “no inch of Arab holy land”. Israel on the contrary, does not stick to its original principles. Mystic desire for “peace in our time in the whole Middle East” a dream of  “new middle East”, and a dream of Western Europe type of arrangements in the Islamic part of this world all bend the current Israeli government to pragmatism with very flexible principles. Israel is dragged all the time towards concessions to the Arabs who do not move, the “Phata Morgana” of the peace is escaping while the blackmail is enhanced.

• Israel is the only state in the world that was founded by people who lived all over the world, who differ in race, secular culture, language, and family history but share the 3500 years religious and historical traditions. Israel is not defined by shared recent history and locality of its people like any other modern state. I am not aware of another precedent in modern history where after 2000 years people came back to their historical homeland and established a new modern state based on a national reunion.
  • Israel is the only state in the world that has no margin of security. If it would lose one battle there will be no Israel for perhaps another 2000 years. Therefore Israel needs doubled and tripled safety margins in any geopolitical arrangement. National security planning should be based on the worst (deteriorated) scenarios and cannot be based on optimistic hopes.
  • The geographical dimensions of Israel are extremely small. Military forces can cross its width in few hours, i.e. it’s strategic depth is extremely limited. Therefore in case of deterioration and attack by any of its neighbors, the battle may be over in a matter of days, including few days of early warning by super modern electronic devices. No foreign friendly force can help Israel with such a short notice. It took the US 6 months to prepare the rescue operation of Kuwait in 1991. Under such scenario, here in Israel there will be nothing to rescue. Therefore Israel cannot afford to rely on foreign guarantees of any kind. It must be able in the first place to defend itself on its own. This cannot be done without essential areas such as the Golan, the Jordan valley and adjacent areas. The short history of modern Israel demonstrated this problem once and again.

Loss of the Golan in this false peace processes might be a fatal precedent for the last phase, the negotiation with the Palestinians regarding the permanent settlement. Israel thus would lose the ability to carve out its own necessary future map according to her vital interests and the historical experience. By yielding to the detrimental slogan of “back to the ’67 border’. Rabin’s statement “the depth of the retreat will be proportional to the depth of peace” means that Israel would shrink to a coastal dense, vulnerable mini-state, kind of a Jewish Hong Kong but very different: It would be facing a massive Arab Eastern Front from Baghdad to the suburbs of Tel Aviv unlike Hong Kong, which is surrounded by people who share its culture and history, and have no aspirations to destroy it.

Thus the imperative step Israel must take in order for its own survival is to overturn this detrimental process by blocking the danger of delivery of the Golan to the Syrians. The aggressors should know that land can be lost in an aggressive war, forever and that another invasion carries heavy long-term risks.

Only this position would allow Israel to promote rational plan for the future coexistence with Palestinians in which Israel will maintain sovereignty over essential areas (the extended practically unpopulated Jordan Valley, the Judean desert, the extended east-west Jerusalem area, the Etzion area and the southern Hebron mountains) and the Jewish settlements blocks in Judea and Samaria and at the same time allow the Palestinians entertain independence under demilitarization

No matter what security substitutes would be offered to Israel in an agreement that is based on the asymmetric process of “land for peace” and withdrawal of Israel from the entire area of the Golan, destruction of 32 settlements and one town, under the terms of the present process (and for that matter there is no difference between the old British-French 1923 line or the June 4^th 1967 line) the implication of the totality of the withdrawal under the non-compromising ultimatum of Assad for the long term future of Israel can be fatal: (a) loss of deterrence, (b) ratification of the non-compromising Arab position that the Jewish presence in any part of the land of Israel is temporary and that it is just a matter of time and patience until the Zionist entity would eventually be defeated and destroyed, similar to the Crusaders state, (c) extension of the same principles to areas that were acquired by Israel in the 1948 defensive war and further stepwise shrinkage of the Jewish state into a defenseless narrow coastal strip, (d) ratification of the basic Arab position that the Jews have no legitimate right to defensible self sufficient homeland in the middle east, (e) total deterioration of the momentum of the Zionist enterprise and loss of the spirit to fight for its survival in the future and hence total loss of the central component of the national deterrence.

Here I must add a personal note. I was a commander of an infantry company in the ninth reserve brigade of the IDF in 1973. We participated in all the combat activities in the Golan and the Syrian front from October 1973 to April 1974. The men in my company, like all other combat unites which were deployed in the Northern front at that time were willing to take endless combat risks for the sake of the survival of our homeland. The very fact that our achievements in the battle field would not be translated to acceptable stable political arrangement, and the encouragement of the Syrians to try again will destroy the spirit of IDF and its ability to win future battles in any of the new fronts. Who would be that crazy to go again “into the fire” with the knowledge that a process like the current one would most probably follow. The spirit of the IDF and of the people will be lost. The spirit is the “number-one” factor in the strength of any nation and army, although it is most difficult to measure it. The notion that the IDF is the strongest military force in the Middle East would no more be true, no matter how much super sophisticated equipment it would be granted. It would be internally paralyzed under the impact of the decisions made by the Policy Makers. This is a major danger ensued by the current process. I heavily doubt whether in another war with any Arab force, after a collapse of a “peace” obtained under the terms of “land for peace”,  Israel could expect its young people to have the capacity to defend it as they did again and again since 1948. They would most probably lack the spirit we had until the beginning of the present deterioration.

The lesson of the implementation of the Camp David accord. 20 years of “peace” under the terms of the “land for peace” process.

What do we have after 20 years of “peace” with Egypt? There was no war with Egypt. But, at the same time there was no war with Syria, with whom Israel has no peace treaty. Moreover, about 15 Israeli citizens were killed by hostile activities on the Egyptian side of the border while no one was even wounded along the Golan lines during that period. The normal attributes of peace conditions, which are called “normalization” in the current process with Egypt are not existing. The commercial exchange between Egypt and Israel is lower than $30 million a year, which means practically no commercial relations. The cultural and scientific connections are null, Egyptian tourists are not seen in Israel, Israelis do not tour Egypt due to the large number of terrorist attacks on Israeli tours. The only active sign of peace is the Egyptian Embassy in Tel Aviv (the ambassador is a former high rank intelligence officer). What else do we have? Egypt used all of the US financial aid for massive military buildup and no one hides the fact that it is aimed against Israel. Egypt is the driving force in promotion of anti-Israeli resolutions in the UN every year (together with the PLO). The extreme anti-Semitic mood and the publication of the mass media in Egypt has never changed. The most hostile groups in Egypt are the educated upper levels of society. In short, no irreversible peaceful “plants” grew up along the Egyptian – Israeli border under the terms of the “land for peace” process. At present Egypt is the most dangerous threat to Israel and high-ranking officials in the Cairo administration do not attempt to hide it.

It seems that the long-term strategy of Egypt towards Israel is based on three phases. (a) Regain of the area lost in the 1967 war, i.e. cancellation of the outcome of the 1967 failure. (b) Revenge by humiliation of Israel, “shrinking it to it natural size” in the terminology so popular by the Egyptian president and his foreign minister. (c) The less visible but known goal, conquest of part of Israel, at least it southern part so as to acquire a continental approach to the rich Persian Gulf. This is the historical goal of all old time Pharos. The geopolitical structure of the Middle East did not change. The strategy did not change by the technology, the tactics did change. Israel was always a cross road for armies from both ends of the well-known “fertile crescent”. It suffers the same risk now. An evidence for this strategy is the constant demand of Egypt to get the southern part of Israel under the claim the it was captured by Israel in the end of the 1948 war. This list of strategic goals looks unbelievable but there are too many signs that should make the Israeli leadership very concerned. The massive military buildup is the strongest contradiction to a transition to peace for a country with 30% of the population illiterate and 30% with chronic diseases. A country with population more than 10 times larger than Israel with a territory almost fifty times larger, but with gross national product smaller than that of Israel.

Egypt is clearly building up a most dangerous threat to Israel, and is leading the anti Israeli actions in the international arena.

B. Why should we expect the “peace” with Assad to be better when the conditions currently offered to him are much less demanding? Why should we expect more open peaceful activities on the Syrian side, when the Egyptian experience is so clear-cut? The fact is that the term “peace” was given a new meaning under the terms of the political process in the Middle East. The actual process is withdrawal to the June 4^th 1967 lines in exchange for a renewed “mild reversible non-belligerence treaty”. Peace is an aspiration of every human being but no one knows whether any time in the future would be peaceful, it is known only for the present or for the past. The “land for peace” process is a political process that so far did not bring peace. Worse of all, this unilateral withdrawal process which drags Israel back to the June 4^th 1967 lines exposes Israel to a risk of much higher probability of another terrible war. Much worse that the current danger.

What should be done?

A stable coexistence of Israel and its Moslem neighbors is possible, provided that Israel adopts a geopolitical Master-Plan and define Red-Lines for negotiations. The “Double Column Plan” (DCP) is a comprehensive plan for Israel first introduced in 1976. A major feature of that plan is the continuum of 15-25 kilometer wide strip of land along the full length of the Eastern border of Israel. The “Eastern column” includes the Golan heights, the Jordan Valley, the Eastern slopes of the central mountains range, the Judean desert and the Eastern part of the Negev desert (the Arava) in the South. This is an area which has no Arab population, it is a solid buffer zone between Israel and the Eastern Front which is essential in peace and in war. The annexation of the area which is needed for ensuring the continuity of the Eastern Column, which is categorically vital for Israel, and a massive development of the Eastern Column and the extended Jerusalem Corridor would enable Israel to maintain deterrence, reduce the chance of war and survive possible future aggression. It would also enable Israel to create active, stable coexistence with the Arabs who live mostly in the center of the Eretz -Israel, from the Galeele, through Judea and Samaria to the Negev desert. Implementation of the DCP would also enable Israel to be much more relaxed in allowing the Palestinians to develop their own identity and political independence.

The current mode of negotiations with the Arab states shows that the red lines defined by the DCP are not acceptable to the Arabs who developed much higher expectations in the past  seven years under the spirit of Oslo. It is widely agreed by now that there is no chance to sign a permanent peace treaty with the Palestinians even under  the surrendering terms of the Oslo declaration. Israel can and should implement the DCP map unilaterally. That action would lead to much more stable state of matters that the current shrinkage into the “Western Column” along the sea shore which would suffer constant pressures for further shrinkage in peace and in war.

The Golan is a major component in any logical comprehensive master plan for the long term future of Israel. There will be much more peace for Israel and its neighbors with the Golan remaining an Israeli territory without formal peace treaty than under any other scenario.

Appendix:

Strategic importance of the Golan Heights in the era of modern technology ( missiles etc.)

The Strategic Importance to Israel of the Golan Heights

 First, holding the Heights gives Israel strategic depth. The Golan territory is roughly 10 miles by 40 miles. All of Israel, including the Golan and the West Bank, is only approximately 45 miles wide by 270 miles. This buffer zone, this extension of territory where Israel faces its most formidable enemy, is an important military asset for Israel. It is an essential part of the essential strip of land along the eastern part of Israel including the Golan, the Jordan Valley, the Judean desert and Eastern part of the Negev desert (the Arava) which compose the “Eastern Column” of the map of Israel which is the central territorial component of the comprehensive “Double column” plan. The Eastern Column enables Israel to survive the dangers from its Eastern front both in peace and in war times. This remains true even in the age of missile warfare. The Eastern  border of the Golan is a line of hills that form a natural border whose defense strength was proved in the 1973 war. In the summer of 1990, all of Kuwait's valuable assets were in easy reach of Iraq's forces, which took them quickly. Still Saudi Arabia's key assets lay across wide stretches of desert, which made an Iraqi conquest far more difficult. Allthough Iraq had Scud missiles, Saudi Arabia's strategic depth spared it the fate of Kuwait.

 Second, control of high ground on the Golan gives Israel direct line-of-sight surveillance and warning of threatening Syrian movements in the plains below or in south Lebanon. Early warning is important to a defense posture that relies, in the event of war, upon a thin line of active forces to hold while reserves mobilize to meet the kind of attacks that Syria's large and well-equipped standing army might mount.

 Third, modern technology has by no means eliminated altogether the disadvantages of having to fight uphill, a reality acknowledged by military commanders everywhere. The operational planning of the U.S. military, for example, still places great emphasis on command of the high ground as a critical force multiplier.

 Fourth, possession of the Golan puts the IDF within easy striking range of Damascus. This contributes to Israeli deterrence against Syria. If deterrence fails and war occurs again, Israel's Golan position enables it to mount spoiling attacks against likely staging areas. And its proximity to Damascus can help deter especially heinous actions – like missile attacks on Israel's cities.

 Fifth, the Golan highlands are a major watershed. Control of the Golan permits control of Lake Kinneret (the "Sea of Galilee") which supplies roughly thirty percent of Israel's consumption.  In that arid region with its growing population increasing the demand for water, control of water resources has   strategic consequences. The significance of this point is often overlooked in military and political analyses.

Demilitarization

Demilitarizing a large portion of south Syria beyond the Golan Heights would mitigate but not eliminate altogether the risks to Israel of withdrawal from the Golan. Demilitarization agreements between adversaries are inherently brittle. The history of Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 illustrates the point. Pledges by democratic states to respond promptly and forcefully to any violation of an arms control arrangement with a non-democratic state have often proven hollow when the time for action came. This was true for the Allies after World War I, for the United States during the Cold War and in Sinai prior to the 1967 war. 

 So, as desirable as the actual demilitarization of south Syria might be, Israel cannot be expected to rely heavily on a demilitarization accord. Ultimately, Israel's security depends not on a demilitarization arrangement that Syria may or may not respect indefinitely but on the IDF's ability to prevail over Syrian forces if Syria renews military hostilities.

.In the conventional field, Syria has improved and is improving its tank fleet in a very impressive manner. If and when Syria will complete its procurement transactions that it has already signed, all of its armored divisions will be equipped with the latest model T-72 tanks. Today Syria has over 4,000 tanks and 300 self-propelled artillery tubes that provide it with an enhanced offensive capability in land battles.

The topography on the eastern border of the Golan facing Syria also constitutes a defensible barrier to massed armored attack. During the 1973 Yom Kippur war, control of the Golan's rocky highlands enabled two brigades of the IDF to hold off an attack of over 1,000 Syrian tanks.

Many Middle Eastern nations are working to acquire ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, and many of these nations maintain a longstanding hostility toward Israel. Nevertheless, the principal threat to Israel's existence for the foreseeable future will remain the danger of a physical invasion and occupation by heavily armored forces.

Simply stated, even though missiles can fly over the highest terrain feature, including the Golan Heights, they do not negate the strategic significance of territorial depth. The military value of missiles depends on their accuracy — on their ability to strike specific military targets. Inaccurate missiles like the Scuds used by Iraq in the Gulf War can terrorize large urban areas. But they are not reliable against military targets — airfields, command and control centers, and bridges — where precision is required.

 If, however, the Syrians — by violating a demilitarization regime, for example — were able to move heavy artillery up to the edge of the Golan escarpment overlooking the Galilee and northern Israel, they could use their relatively accurate artillery against military targets within a range of approximately 25 miles, depending on their ability to observe and correct fire. Artillery munitions, of which Syria has large quantities, are relatively inexpensive, especially compared to missiles. Destroying significant military targets within this range would be a matter, in essence, of firing enough rounds.

 On the other hand, if Israeli control of the Golan ensures that Syrian artillery is confined to the plateau behind the Heights, few targets in Israel would be within range of the Syrian artillery. Syria could attempt to strike those targets with ballistic missiles, but then they would encounter the problem of inaccuracy, not to mention the prohibitive cost and limited number of weapons in inventory. Also, the United States and Israel both have programs to develop defenses against ballistic missiles. Given adequate resources, these programs may substantially limit the military effectiveness of offensive missiles. There are, however, no defenses available against artillery other than counter-fire to destroy the artillery pieces themselves.

In short, possession of intermediate-range ballistic missiles does not give Syria a capability to fight Israel as effectively from behind the Golan Heights as it could from the Heights themselves.

Achieving military success in a war requires more than lobbing a few score (or even a few hundred) missiles of limited accuracy at soft targets. Iraq fired approximately forty Scuds at Israel in the Gulf War, killing one civilians and no soldiers and achieving nothing of military significance. To win a war against Israel, Syria must move armor, infantry and artillery forward and down into Israeli proper, and then destroy Israeli forces on the ground. This was true in 1948, it was true in 1967 and 1973, and it remains true in today's Age of Missiles.

 Land for Peace

The argument that "peace is better than territory" is valid only as long as there is peace. But if war were to break out again, no one can seriously suggest that Israel would be better off holding a treaty signed by Assad than holding the Golan Heights.

Who is Syria under Assad?

Assad does not conduct peaceful relations with any of Syria's Muslim neighbors. He supports and harbors anti-Turkish PKK Kurdish terrorism, claiming Syrian sovereignty over southeastern Turkey (Hatay).  Assad has continued (on-again-off-again) the 13 centuries-old Syrian-Iraqi conflict. Assad invaded Lebanon in 1975, slaughtered the Christian leadership in October 1990, and has brutally annexed Lebanon to Syria. Syria invaded Jordan in 1970 and threatened to invade in 1980 and 1989,  while systematically breeding subversion there, including attempts to assassinate Jordanian leaders…

Under Syrian occupation Lebanon has become the largest terrorist camp in the world, and a conduit for heroin and other drugs (which garner about a billion dollars a year in the pockets of Assad and his cronies). Lebanon has become a springboard for Syrian/Iranian-supported Hizbullah terrorism.

Syria is one of the most active proliferators of weaponry of mass destruction in the world in the area of biological and chemical weaponry and ballistic missiles technologies. It cooperates, in violation of international covenants and agreements, with Iran, Pakistan, China, Russia, North Korea and Libya.